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1. Introduction 
Business cycles have ambiguous effects on the rate of new firm formation. On the 
one hand economic downturns discourage opportunity entrepreneurship, by reduc-
ing the profitability of good ideas. On the other hand, downturns induce increases 
in the rate of necessity entrepreneurship, where individuals create businesses pri-
marily because of involuntary job loss and the scarcity of vacancies. [Blau(1987) 
Evans and Leighton (1990), Blanchflower and Meyer (1994)]. The net effect of 
these two countervailing forces is that rates of new business creation may rise or 
fall during recessions. Indeed, the recent recession has had opposite effects on the 
rate of new business creation in Canada and the United States: between Octo-
ber 2008 and October 2009, self-employment declined by over four percent in the 
United States (Shane 2010) while in Canada it increased by the same amount 
[LaRochelle-Côté (2010)]. Recent macroeconometric evidence [Thurik et al. 
(2008)] suggests that on average increases in unemployment stimulate self-
employment among OECD countries, but country-specific effects seem to be 
strong. 
Whether the net effect of recessions is to increase or decrease new business for-
mation, increases in the fraction of new businesses that are founded by necessity 
entrepreneurs are likely to have marked effects on the quality of new businesses. 
Necessity entrepreneurs typically have less human and financial capital [Caliendo, 
and Kritikos (2009)], and they are less likely to have business ideas with signifi-
cant growth prospects [Shane (2009)]. As a result, they also invest less in their 
business [Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Santarelli and Vivarelli, (2007)], and they 
are less likely to incorporate [Bruhn (2008)].  
Reduced business quality, lower investment, and lower human capital together 
imply lower earnings and lower earnings growth rates for necessity entrepreneurs 
[e.g., Bates (1990), Preisendörfer and Voss (1990)]. These factors also imply lower 
survival rates for necessity entrepreneurs [e.g., Block and Wagner (2010), Calien-
do and Kritikos (2009)], and there is some tentative evidence that these lower 
survival rates may be entirely explained by differences in human capital [Block 
and Sandner (2009)]. However, because of their lower human capital, necessity 
entrepreneurs also have lower opportunity costs after any recession is over. Thus, 
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despite evidence indicating lower average survival rates, some necessity entrepre-
neurs are likely to persist in business for quite some time while earning relatively 
little [Gimeno at al. (1997), Hamilton (2000)]. 
Figure 1 illustrates some of these forces at work in Ireland during the recent re-
cession. After a long period of decline, from 2002 to 2008, the rate of nascent 
entrepreneurial activity recorded by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor rose 
significantly between 2008 and 2010. At the same time, there was a dramatic 
increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs reporting that they were creating busi-
nesses out of necessity rather than because good opportunities had presented 
themselves. Between 2002 and 2008, necessity entrepreneurship had never ac-
counted for more than fifteen percent of nascent entrepreneurs; in 2010 they ac-
counted for over thirty percent. Note also the marked decline between 2008 and 
2010 in the discontinuation rate – the rate at which nascent entrepreneurs give 
up business activities and (in most cases) return to wage employment.  
 
Figure 1. Entrepreneurial  activity in Ireland, 2002-2010. Source; Kel-
ley et al. (2011, p. 51) 
 
This paper constructs and numerically evaluates a model that builds on two 
premises. First, that necessity entrepreneurs account for a larger fraction of busi-
nesses among cohorts of firms created during recessions. Second, necessity entre-
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preneurs operate firms with relatively poor performance, but many of them con-
tinue in operation for extended periods of time. We conjecture that these two 
premises together imply that transitory economic downturns induce long-lasting 
effects through the quality of the business they spawn.  
To examine this conjecture, we construct a simple dynamic model of occupational 
choice in the presence of involuntary job loss and uncertain job finding, in which 
agents vary in their innate ability. The model yields three distinct sets of agents: 
a group of high-ability opportunity entrepreneurs who create businesses regard-
less of the state of the economy; a group of moderate-ability agents who only 
create businesses as necessity entrepreneurs after involuntary job loss; and a 
group of low-ability agents who never create businesses. Business earnings are 
stochastically increasing in ability, so necessity entrepreneurs on average earn less 
than opportunity entrepreneurs. However, the profit level that triggers exit is 
endogenously increasing in ability, so necessity entrepreneurs will continue to 
operate businesses that opportunity entrepreneurs would abandon.  
We then calibrate the model using estimates from the literature on relative per-
formance and survival, and examine the evolution of the distribution of profits 
among cohorts of firms that were created during recessions and during normal 
times. Our model suggests that a short-lived recession can induce an economically 
meaningful decline in the earnings of a cohort, and this decline persists for many 
years after the economy has returned to full-employment. For example, median 
earnings of new businesses are, immediately upon entry, about one percent lower 
for a cohort entering in a recession year than for a baseline cohort. This differ-
ence grows over time, despite the more rapid exit rate of low-ability entrepre-
neurs. After four years, median earnings differ by about 2.2 percent, and after ten 
years by about 2.4 percent. 
2. Ability and Entry into Self-Employment 
Ability is indexed by a. Employees earn a wage, ( ),w a  which is increasing in 
ability. At the end of the period they retain their job with probability ( ),m a  
where ( ) 0m a¢ ³ , and with probability 1 ( )m a-  they are laid off. Agents may 
eschew wage work in favor of establishing a business. Doing so costs nothing, but 
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it takes one period to establish the business, which does not begin to yield a flow 
of income until the next period. An unemployed agent has two choices. First, he 
may actively search for a job, which yields employment in the subsequent period 
with probability ( ),l a  where ( ) 0.l a¢ ³  Unemployment benefits, ( ),b a ( ) 0,b a¢ ³  
are payable only to agents who were involuntarily laid off and are actively look-
ing for work, and they are payable only for the first period of unemployment. 
Second, the agent may establish a business. It is not possible to establish a busi-
ness and look for wage work, so no unemployment benefits are payable in this 
case. 
2.1 Occupational Choices 
Let ( )
E
V a  and ( )
S
V a  denote the values of being employed and having estab-
lished a business. We will define the expected payoff to self-employment later, 
and for the moment we will simply note that it is strictly increasing in a. Let 
1( )
U
V a  denote the value of being unemployed in the first period after being laid 
off, and let 2( )
U
V a  denote the value in the second and subsequent periods of un-
employment. 
The Bellman equation for a wage worker is 
 { }1( ) max ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ), ( )E E U SV w V V Va a bm a a b m a a b a= + + - . (1) 
The first-period of involuntary unemployment yields value 
 { }1 2( ) max ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ), ( )U E U SV b V V Va a bl a a b l a a b a= + + - , (2) 
while the second and subsequent periods yield 
 { }2 2( ) max ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ), ( )U E U SV V V Va bl a a b l a a b a= + - . (3) 
We make the following assumptions: 
 A.1  ( ) ( ) ,w a b a a> "  
 A.2  ( ) ( ) ,m a l a a³ "  
A.3  Let 
E
A  denote the set of employed agents that do not immediately 
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enter self-employment. Then ( ) ( ) .S E EV Va a a¢ ¢> " Î A  
Assumption A.1 says that wages exceed unemployment benefits for all abilities. 
A.2 states that keeping a job is more likely than finding a job for all abilities. 
These two assumptions are not contentious: in the United States, national aver-
age unemployment benefits are 36 percent of previous earnings [Fletcher and 
Hedgpeth (2010)], while job retention rates are much greater than job finding 
rates in all OECD countries [Hobijn and Sahin (2007, Table 4)].  
The third assumption states that expected self-employment earnings are more 
sensitive to ability than are wages. As is well known [cf. Jovanovic (1994)], if no 
restrictions are imposed on the returns to ability in self-employment relative to 
wage work, essentially arbitrary relationships between ability and occupational 
choice are possible. Assumption A.3 is consistent with Rosen's (1981) theory of 
superstars, in which the most able must enter self-employment in order to cap-
ture the full returns to their ability. It is also consistent with empirical evidence. 
For example, in samples that are reasonably representative of the population as a 
whole [e.g., Hamilton's (2000) analysis of the SIPP sample] the self-employed 
earn less than their observationally-equivalent counterparts in wage work, while 
in samples that focus on higher ability workers [e.g., Gort and Lee (2007) and 
Ohyama (2007), both using the SESTAT sample] self-employment earnings ex-
ceeds wages among the most able and are lower than wages among the less able 
in the sample.  
Assumptions A.1 through A.3 are sufficient to establish the following result: 
LEMMA 1. (a), 1( ), ( ),E UV Va a  and 2( )UV a  are increasing in a. (b) 1( ) ( )E UV Va a³
2( ),
U
V a³ with strict inequalities for a sufficiently small. 
We establish these results by graphical means. Figure 2 illustrates the choices 
that are made by agents as their ability varies. By assumption A.3, the present 
value of establishing a business intersects the value of continuing in wage em-
ployment once from below, indicated by a3. Self-employment is preferred to wage 
employment only for agents with ability greater than a3. Below this threshold, 
1( ) ( )
E U
V Va a> , so the agent in his first period of unemployment who is indiffe-
rent between job search and business creation has ability level 
2 3
a a< . Similar-
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ly, 1 2( ) ( )
U U
V Va a>  for all 2,a a<  yielding a third critical value, 1 2;a a<  agents 
in their second period of unemployment with ability level greater than a1 aban-
don job search and establish a business. We summarize these observations in the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. There exist 
1 2 3
a a a< <  such that (a) if 
3
,a a>  the agent al-
ways chooses self-employment; (b) if 
1
,a a<  the agent never chooses self-
employment; (c) if 
2 3
,a a a< <  the agent chooses self-employment in the 
first period of unemployment, and (d) if 
1 2
,a a a< <  the agent chooses self-
employment in the second period of unemployment. 
For ease of reference, we shall refer to agents that form a business regardless of 
their employment status as opportunity entrepreneurs. Agents that create a 
business immediately after involuntary job loss will be referred to as necessity I 
entrepreneurs, while those that enter only after losing unemployment benefits will 
be referred to as necessity II entrepreneurs. 
( )
S
Vb a
1( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
E U
w V Va bm a a b m a+ + -
2( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
E U
b V Va bl a a b l a+ + -
2( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
E U
V Vbl a a b l a+ -
a3a2a1a
( )
E
V a
1( )
U
V a
2( )
U
V a
Figure 2. Occupational choices by ability. 
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2.2 Self-Employment Earnings and Exit 
Self-employment earnings are not known in advance of establishing the business. 
Agents contemplating business entry know only that per-period profits are given 
by 
 ( )
t t
q qp g e= + , (4) 
where q is fixed business quality and e is an idiosyncratic shock to earnings. The 
value of the shock in the first period after business creation is normalized to zero. 
Quality is a random draw from the conditional distribution ( | )F q a , which is 
strictly decreasing in a. That is, business quality is stochastically increasing in 
agent ability. The idiosyncratic shocks exhibit persistence: they are draws from 
( ' | )G e e , which is strictly decreasing in e. 
Job search is not possible while creating or managing a business, and unemploy-
ment benefits are not payable to agents who close down their business.1 We shall 
also assume that an agent who closes down his business cannot create another 
business without first receiving an offer of wage employment. Thus, we can write 
the opportunity cost of continuation as 
 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
U E U
V V Va bl a a b l a a= + -  
         2
( )
( ) ( )
1 (1 ( )) E U
V V
bl a a ab l a= º- - .  (5) 
As in Hopenhayn (1992), there exists a profit threshold, *( ),p a  such that agents 
close their business the first period that profits fall below the threshold. The op-
portunity cost of business ownership is increasing in a, so the exit threshold is 
higher for more able agents. The Bellman equation for a business owner with 
ability a and currently earning profits p is given by 
                                         
1 Former business owners do not generally qualify for unemployment benefits unless 
they paid unemployment insurance. For sole proprietorships, partnerships, and own-
ers of limited liability companies, payment into unemployment insurance requires 
electing to have one's business treated as a corporation for tax purposes. Few small 
business owners choose to do so in practice.  
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 { }3( , ) max ( , ') ( ' | ), ( )S s UV V dH Va p p b a p p p a= + ò  (6) 
where H is strictly decreasing in p. The effect of agent ability on the expected 
duration of a business is in general ambiguous. On the one hand, higher-ability 
agents will be more likely to abandon a business of any given quality because 
their opportunity cost of continuation is greater. On the other hand, higher-
ability agents are more likely to establish a high-quality business, which induces 
longer survival times. Which of these effects dominate depends on the sensitivity 
to ability of expected business quality, and the effect of business quality on the 
likelihood that profits fall below the appropriate threshold for an agent. It is easy 
to conjure up examples in which expected business survival is increasing in abili-
ty, decreasing in ability, or in which the relationship is non-monotonic.  
As qp g=  in the first period of entry, the expected value of creating a business 
is given by 
     ( )
*
2
*
( )
( )
( ) ( ) | ( ) ( | )
1 (1 ( ))S E
q
V F V qdF q
p a
b l ab a p a a a bg ab l a
³
= +- - ò  
                                      
*
2
( )
( , ') ( ' | ) ( | )
s
q
V dH q dF q
p a
b a p p a
³
+ òò . (7) 
Equations (1)-(3) and (7) define the optimal choices in the model, which are as 
described in Proposition 1 as long as assumption A.3 holds. From (7), it is easy 
to verify that ( )SV a  is strictly increasing in g, so that  a sufficient condition for 
Assumption A.3 to hold is that g be sufficiently large. 
3. Dynamics of the Firm Size Distribution 
In this section, we analyze a simple model of firm growth and survival. The mod-
el, which is presented in subsection 3.1, is a standard neoclassical growth model 
[cf. Hopenhayn (1992)], in which initial earnings depend on business quality, 
earnings growth is exogenous and stochastic, and the exit threshold depends on 
agent ability. Subsection 3.2 reviews empirical evidence on the growth and sur-
vival of young businesses, and uses this evidence to calibrate parameters of the 
Necessity and Opportunity Entrepreneurs 9 
model. The calibrated model is then used in subsection 3.3 to measure the persis-
tence of low-quality cohorts born during recessions. 
3.1 Firm growth and survival 
Suppose that  
 1( )t t tq te q e su-= + + , (8) 
Where ( ) 0qq¢ ³  gives potentially better growth prospects to higher-quality busi-
nesses, and tu  is a standard normal random variable. To explore the survival 
time of a firm with quality q founded by an agent with ability a, we need the 
distribution of the Markov time, T, that satisfies 
 { }*inf : ( ) ( )tT t qp p a= £ , (9) 
where ( ) ( )t tq q t qp q e- = +  is a random variable with normally-distributed in-
crements in each period. This is a first-passage problem which, following conven-
tion, we will analyze in continuous time. Define 
 
( )
t
t
q q tq pw s
+ -= , (10) 
which is normal with zero mean and variance t, while the increments to wt are 
independent standard Normals. The continuous time stochastic process that gives 
rise to the same distribution as wt at t=0,1,2, . . . , is a standard zero-drift Wien-
er process, ( ),tw  with boundary condition w(0)=0. The absorbing barrier for tp   
is *( )p a  Hence, the corresponding barrier for ( )tw  is obtained by replacing tp  in 
(10) with *( ).p a  The transformed first passage problem is therefore given by the 
distribution of the Markov time, T, that satisfies 
 
*( ) ( )
inf : ( ) .
q t q
T
q p at w t s s
ì üï ï-ï ï= ³ +í ýï ïï ïî þ
 (11) 
Equation (11) defines the first-passage time of a Wiener process to a linear bar-
rier that is moving away from the origin if ( ) 0,qq >  and toward the origin if 
( ) 0qq <  (Figure 3 plots the former case). Exit is immediate if *( )q p a£ . For 
*( ),q p a>  the distribution of T  is given by the well-known Bachelier-Lévy for-
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mula [e.g., Cox and Miller (1965:221)] 
 
* 2
* *
2 ( )/
2 2
( | , ) ,q
q t q t
P T q e
T T
q p sp q p qa
s s
- -æ ö æ ö- + - -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç= F - + F -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø   
 (12) 
where ( )F   is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable, 
and where for clarity the dependence of q on q and of p* on a have been sup-
pressed. 
Taking the limit of (12) yields 
 
 
* 22 ( )/
1, if ( ) 0
( , ) lim ( | , ) .
1, if ( ) 0qT
q
P q P T q
e qq p s
qa a q
¥
- -¥
ìï £ï= = íï < >ïïî
 (13) 
If there is no positive drift to profits, all firms eventually die. In contrast, with 
positive drift, some firm will survive indefinitely. The unconditional distribution 
of firm exit times is then obtained by taking expectations over q and over the 
ability distribution of firm owners. 
Figure 3. The first passage problem. 
 
 
0
tT
*( )q q t 

 
( )t
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The evolution of the distribution of the size of surviving firms is straightforward 
to characterize. Let ( )tw  denote the value at time t of the Wiener process (10). 
For any ( )* / ,t qw q p s< + -  the probability that ( )tw w=  without having pre-
viously crossed the boundary is given by the complement to the crossing proba-
bility of a Brownian bridge that begins at (0) 0,w =  terminates at ( ) ,tw w=  and 
has an absorbing boundary ( )* / .t qq p s+ -  This is a well-known distribution 
[e.g., Scheike (1992), Proposition 3], given by 
 
*
( ; , ) Pr ( ) [0, ] | ( )
t
t q
q t t
q py w a w t t w ws
ì üï ï+ -ï ïº < " Î =í ýï ïï ïî þ  
               
* * *
*
2
1 exp ,
0,
q t q t q
t
t q
p q p q pw ws s s
q pw s
ì ì üæ öæ öï ï ï- + - + -ï ÷ ÷ï ïç ç÷ ÷ï - - - <ç çí ý÷ ÷ï ç ç÷ ÷ï ïç çï è øè øï ï= î þíï + -ïï ³ïïïî
. (14) 
As the unconditional distribution of ( )tw  is normal with mean zero and variance 
t, the density of w at time t among surviving firms is obtained upon weighting 
each point in the density of a truncated standard normal random variable by the 
relative probability that the process attains that particular value of w at time t 
without having previously crossed the absorbing barrier. That is,   
 *( ( ))/
( ; , ) ( )
( | , )
( ; , ) ( )
t t
t q
t t
q
g q
q d
p a s
y w a f ww a
y w a f w w-
-¥
=
ò
, (15) 
where ( )
t
f w  is the normal density with mean zero and variance t. Then, by the 
method of transformations, the density of profits among surviving firms is 
 
( )
( )*( )/
( ) / ; , (( ) / )
( | , )
; , ( )
t t
t q
t t
t q q t q
g q
q d
p s
y f p s a f q p sp a
s y w a f w w-
-¥
+ - + -=
ò
 (16) 
Taking expectations of (16) over q and a yields the predicted observable distribu-
tion of size among all surviving firms. Before doing so, however, it is useful to 
delineate some basic properties of the conditional distribution (16).  
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PROPERTIES OF THE CONDITIONAL SIZE DISTRIBUTION. (a) For any 0,t >  
[ | , )]
t
g qp a  is positively skewed, with both mean and skewness rising over 
time. (b) For any ,a a¢ >  [ | , )] [ | , )]
t t
E q E qp a p a¢ -  is increasing over time. 
These properties are each the direct result of the slower growth and selective exit 
of underperforming firms. Figure 4 illustrates for the case q = 0.25. At t = 0, all 
firms begin with profits of q. Subsequently, expected profits rise, as does their 
variance. Selection eliminates firms from the lower tail of the distribution, raising 
its mean and inducing skewness. Because the exit threshold, *( ),p a  is increasing 
in a, these selection effects are stronger among more able operators of firms with 
given business quality q. As a result the profit distributions for the a-type and 
a¢ -type entrepreneurs diverge over time. 
 
 
Figure 4. Conditional size distribution of surviving firms with constant 
business quality. q = 2, *( ) 1,p a =  *( ) 1.5,p a¢ =  s = 1, q = 0.25. 
0
10 5
0
5
qp*(a)
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Figure 4 holds business quality constant, and the evolving differences in the two 
distributions they each depict are driven entirely by the stronger selection effects 
on high-ability owners. Put another way, low-ability owners of businesses with a 
given business quality survive longer on average than high-ability owners of simi-
lar businesses. Empirical evidence, however, shows that survival is increasing in 
ability. In our calibrated model, we achieve consistency with empirical evidence 
because business quality is increasing in ability, sufficiently so as to offset the  
 
 
Figure 5. Conditional size distribution of surviving firms with varying 
business qualities. ( ) 2,q a =  ( ) 2.5,q a¢ = *( ) 1,p a =  *( ) 1.5,p a¢ =  s =1, 
( ) 0,q a =  ( ) 0.25q a¢ = . 
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stronger selection effects coming from the higher exit threshold.2 Figure 5 pro-
vides an illustration of the way the profit distributions can evolve when business 
quality is (deterministically) greater for the more able entrepreneur. Profits in 
this case begin at different initial values, and then the difference in mean growth 
rates induce more rapid diverge than in the previous case. 
The observable distribution of profits is, of course, an average of the separate 
distributions, weighted by the fraction of each business type, defined by the pair 
{q, a}, surviving at each point in time. In the case of this second example, the 
weight on the distribution for high-quality businesses monotonically increases 
over time (see Figure 6). Eventually all low-quality businesses fail, so the distri-
bution of profits among surviving firms converges on the distribution for high-
quality businesses. However, because some low-ability entrepreneurs do very well, 
the rate of convergence may be very slow. 
3.2 Parameterization 
The effects of a surge in opportunity entrepreneurship on the subsequent size 
distribution of young firms depends on a number of features of the model: (i) 
differences between the initial earnings of necessity and opportunity entrepre-
neurs3, (ii) differences between the average growth rates of earnings of necessity 
and opportunity entrepreneurs, (iii) the variance of profit growth, and (iv) the 
relationship between entrepreneurial type and the exit threshold. To determine 
the effect of recessions,  we will also need information on the effect of unemploy-
ment on entry into self-employment. We review the existing literature to derive 
some plausible parameterizations for these components of the model. 
Business Duration. Our baseline for differences in survival between opportunity  
                                        
2  A plausible alternative modeling choice would be to assume that the drift term is 
increasing in ability rather than business quality. In this case, if ( )q a¢  is large 
enough, high-ability owners of a given business quality will survive longer than low-
ability owners. 
3 Recall that there are two degrees of necessity entrepreneurs: those that begin to 
create a business immediately upon becoming unemployed (necessity I), and those 
that do so only after losing unemployment benefits (necessity II).  
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Figure 6. Survival rates. ( ) 2,q a =  ( ) 2.5,q a¢ = *( ) 1,p a =  
*( ) 1.5,p a¢ =  s = 1, ( ) 0,q a =  ( ) 0.25q a¢ = . 
 
and necessity entrepreneurs comes from a recent study by Caliendo and Kritikos 
(2009). They study a sample of over 1,850 German males, all of whom entered 
self-employment from unemployment in the third quarter of 2003 and received  
official assistance during their start-up phase. Two surveys were conducted. The 
first, conducted at the time of startup, obtained information about personal cha-
racteristics as well as motivations for business creation. This survey enabled Ca-
liendo and Kritikos to distinguish between respondents who only identified posi-
tive factors that pulled them into business, those who identified a mixture of pull 
and push factors, and those who only identified push factors. The last two groups 
were much more likely than the first to have been unemployed for more than six 
months, to have earned less in unemployment benefits, to be less educated and 
less skilled, and to be an immigrant. 
The second survey, conducted about 28 months later, identifies exit times of 
failed businesses. Figure 7 shows the Kaplan-Meier plots of business survival es-
timated by Caliendo and Kritikos. After one year, the survival rates were 92 per-
cent for pull entrepreneurs, 79 percent for push entrepreneurs, and 84 percent for 
the intermediate group. After around 28 months, the corresponding survival rates  
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Figure 7. Business survival rates of 1,855 German men entering self-
employment, according to self-reported motivational factors. From 
Caliendo and Kritikos (2009). 
 
were 77, 58, and 66 percent, respectively. At each point in time, the survival rate 
of push entrepreneurs was about 80 percent of the survival rate of pull entrepre-
neurs; the rate for the push-pull types was about 90 percent of the rate of pull 
types. 
Although all of the respondents in Caliendo and Kritikos' sample were previously 
unemployed, we shall apply their estimated relative survival rates to our oppor-
tunity, necessity I and necessity II groups. These numbers are not out of line 
with other studies. Block and Sandner (2009), using a sample from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSEPS) with annual frequency, distinguish be-
tween opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs according to whether they had 
voluntary or involuntary separations from wage work prior to business creation, 
They find that the hazard of business failure among opportunity entrepreneurs is 
about 75 percent of the hazard among necessity entrepreneurs.4 Carrasco (1999) 
                                        
4 We exponentiate the appropriate coefficient in column 1 of their Table 3. They 
subsequently conclude that much of this difference between the two groups is attri-
Necessity and Opportunity Entrepreneurs 17 
estimated quarterly exit hazards using data from a large Spanish panel. She finds 
an unusually high rate of immediate exit (40 percent within three months) for 
those who had entered from unemployment, but after nine months the likelihood 
of surviving an additional quarter was 89 percent for opportunity entrepreneurs 
and 75 percent for necessity entrepreneurs. Finally, using annual Portuguese da-
ta, Baptista and Karaöz (2006) report failure odds ratios between previously em-
ployed and previous unemployed entrepreneurs ranging from 60 percent to 90 
percent.   
Self-Employment Earnings. A number of studies provide estimates of the effect 
on earnings of previous unemployment immediately prior to self-employment 
entry. Among the best known is the evidence from the NLSY offered by Evans 
and Leighton (1989). They report that each week of unemployment during the 
year prior to a respondent’s first report of self-employment earnings is associated 
with a 0.8 percent decline in average earnings. Suppose that necessity I entrepre-
neurs enter self-employment after 13 weeks of unemployment (unemployment 
benefits typically expire after 26 weeks), and suppose necessity II entrepreneurs 
enter after 26 weeks. Then Evans and Leighton's estimate implies that ( | )qp a  is 
on average 10.4 percent lower for necessity I entrepreneurs, and 20.8 percent low-
er among necessity II entrepreneurs, than it is for opportunity entrepreneurs. 
These numbers are in line with estimates from some recent studies. Using a larger 
sample from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), Åstebro, Chen 
and Thompson (2011, Table 9) find that transitioning into self-employment from 
unemployment reduces earnings in the first year by between 14.7 percent and 
17.5 percent, depending on specification, compared with those who transition 
from paid work.5 Similarly, Block and Wagner find in the GSEPS that surviving 
necessity entrepreneurs earn on average 15.7 percent less than opportunity entre-
preneurs. 
Block and Wagner also provide separate estimates of the average growth rates of 
                                        
butable to differences in education levels and industry choice. 
5 Entering self-employment after being economically inactive the previous year has an 
even larger effect on earnings, ranging from 28.4 percent to 32.5 percent. 
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earnings. They report that earnings of necessity entrepreneurs decline on average 
at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, while those of opportunity entrepreneurs in-
crease on average by 0.9 percent per year. 
Calibration. We now have enough information to carry out some calibrations. 
Table 1 summarizes the target moments. The survival rates are taken from Fig-
ure 7, and relative average initial profits are taken from Evans and Leighton's 
estimates. The average trend growth rates of earnings are based on Block and 
Wagner, allowing for somewhat better trend growth among necessity I entrepre-
neurs than among necessity II entrepreneurs. Turning to the parameters to be 
calibrated, we shall for simplicity assume that initial profits is the same for all 
entrepreneurs of a given type; the growth rate of profits also has a common va-
riance across each type. Finally, we assume the exit threshold within each entre-
preneur group is constant.  
 
Table 1. Target Moments and Parameters 
 Opportunity Necessity I Necessity II 
Survival rates: 
   t = 1 
   t = 2 
   t = 2.5 
 
0.91 
0.84 
0.74 
 
0.85 
0.70 
0.65 
 
0.79 
0.64 
0.57 
Initial profits, q 
Average profit growth, q/q 
Variance of profit growth 
Exit threshold 
p0 
+1.0% 
s2 
*
1p  
0.9p0 
-2.0% 
s2 
*
2p  
0.8p0 
-3.0% 
s2 
*
3p  
 
We have five free parameters, 2 * *0 1 2, , , ,s p p p  and *3,p to match to nine mean 
survival rates (we will impose the conditions on initial profits and average profit 
growth). In matching survival rates, however, only the differences *0 ip p-  mat-
ter, so we arbitrarily set p0 = 100. The resulting calibrated values, along with 
their implied survival rates, are summarized in Table 2. We are able to match 
the empirical survival rates very well. Moreover, the implied exit thresholds satis-
fy * * *1 2 3,p p p> > as predicted by the model. 
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Table 2. Calibrated Parameters and Implied Survival Rates 
 Opportunity Necessity I Necessity II 
 q 
 q 
 s 
*
ip   
100 
 +1.0 
24.7 
56.0 
  90 
 -1.8 
24.7 
51.7 
   80 
-2.4 
24.7 
45.9 
Implied survival rates: 
   t = 1 
   t = 2 
   t = 2.5 
 
0.93 
0.81 
0.76 
 
0.87 
0.70 
0.64 
 
0.81 
0.63 
0.57 
 
Recessions and Necessity Entrepreneurship. The final preparatory task is to de-
vise a reasonable scenario for the effects of a recession-induced change in the mix 
of entrepreneurs in a cohort. We begin with estimates from Evans and Leighton's 
(1989) analysis of the Current Population Survey, that found a 4.7 percent rate 
of entry into self-employment among unemployed white males, and a rate of 2.4 
percent among white male wage workers. We compare the effects of two scena-
rios. In the first, baseline, scenario, we assume that five percent of wage workers 
lose their jobs involuntarily in any given year, with ten percent of these newly 
unemployed agents remaining without wage work into the second year. In the 
second, recession, scenario, we assume a ten percent rate of involuntary job loss, 
with 25 percent of the unemployed failing to find wage work within the first year.  
Figures 8 and 9 calculate the implied rates of entry by type of entrepreneur over 
a two-year period. In the baseline scenario, the total entry rate over a two-year 
period is 4.9 percent, of which 89.8 percent are opportunity entrepreneurs. Of the 
reminder, 9.8 percent are necessity I entrepreneurs and a negiligble 0.4 percent 
are necessity entrepreneurs. The recession scenario induces only a modest rise, to 
5.19 percent, in the total entrepreneurship entry rate. However, there is a marked 
rise in the fraction that are necessity I and II entrepreneurs, who now account for 
15.4 percent and 2.3 percent of total entrants respectively. 
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Figure 8. Baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 9. Recession scenario. 
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These scenarios seem reasonable. Glocker and Steiner (2007) estimate that the 
transition rate into self-employment for German men [women] rises by 0.1 per-
cent points [0.06 percentage points] for each one-percent increase in the one-year 
lagged unemployment rate. Thurik et al. (2008) estimate a VAR for 23 OECD  
countries, and find that a permanent one percent increase in the unemployment 
rate raises the self-employment rate by between 0.06 percent and 0.24 percent, 
depending upon lag length. Our scenarios yield an increase in the transition rate 
of 0.058 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate. 
3.3 The Persistence of Low-Quality Cohorts 
We study the evolution of the earnings distributions of two cohorts. Each cohort 
combines opportunity, necessity I and necessity II entrepreneurs in the propor-
tions indicated in the previous subsection. The baseline cohort consists of 89.8 
percent opportunity, 9.8 percent necessity I and 0.4 percent necessity II entrepre-
neurs. In the recession cohort, the corresponding proportions are 82.3 percent, 
15.4 percent, and 2.3 percent. The two cohorts differ only by the proportion of 
each entrepreneur type they initially contain: within each type, the process of 
firm growth and exit is the same for both cohorts. 
Figures 10 through 12 summarize our results. Figure 10 plots the earnings distri-
butions of surviving firms for the two cohorts at three different points in time. 
The baseline cohort, as expected, first-order stochastically dominates the reces-
sion cohort, but differences are apparently modest at every earnings level. In both 
cohorts, the mean and variance are increasing with the passage of time: the posi-
tive trend growth of opportunity entrepreneurs and the exit of underperforming 
firms together outweigh the negative trend growth of necessity entrepreneurs. 
Figure 11 plots earnings over time at different percentiles of the distributions. 
For percentiles above the median, earnings rise monotonically over time. In con-
trast, earnings at low percentiles decline before establishing a positive trend. At 
these lower percentiles, negative shocks to the stochastic component of growth 
are at first sufficient to dominate the average positive trend growth of the cohort. 
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Figure 10. Earnings distributions by cohort type and age. 
 
Eventually, however, exit of the worst performers enables the trend growth to 
dominate even at the lower percentiles. 
Finally, Figure 12 plots the proportional difference between earnings of the two 
cohorts at different percentiles and over time. At t = 0, all firms of a given type 
earn the same; the difference between the two cohorts is a modest 0.95 percent. 
Two features of Figure 12 are particularly noteworthy. First, the largest propor-
tional differences emerge in the tails of the distribution. Second, at every percen-
tile, the proportional difference grows over time. For example, the gap between 
median earnings of the two cohorts rises to 2.22 percent by t = 4, and to 2.37 
percent by t = 10. Given our calibration, the appropriate interpretation of a unit 
of t is a year. Consequently, our calibrated model yields results consistent with 
our conjecture that excess entry of necessity entrepreneurs during recessions can 
have highly persistent effects on the earnings distribution of young firms.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper developed a simple model of occupational choice in the presence of 
involuntary unemployment. Our model predicts that high-ability agents choose 
business creation regardless of their employment status, while low-ability agents  
50                           100                         150                          200                         250
t=0.25
t=1
t=4
Baseline cohort
Recession cohort
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Figure 11. Evolution of earnings by percentile and year after entry. 
 
Figure 12. Baseline and recession cohort earnings differentials, by 
percentile and year after entry. 
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choose to create a business only after involuntary job separation. Reflecting re-
cent literature on the motivations for business creation, we refer to the former 
group as opportunity entrepreneurs and to the latter group as necessity entrepre-
neurs. 
We exploited existing empirical evidence distinguishing the post-entry perfor-
mance of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs to calibrate a standard model 
of firm growth and survival. Necessity entrepreneurs are more common during 
recessions. They also have lower initial earnings, lower growth, and higher exit 
rates. We showed that, despite their higher exit rates, enough necessity entrepre-
neurs survive over long periods of time to create highly persistent effects of even 
short-lived recessions.  
Our modeling, both of occupational choices and firm performance, is rather sty-
lized. For example, we have assumed that occupational choice depends on the 
state of the economy only thoughts its effect on an agent’s employment status. 
We do not consider the likelihood that both business earnings and the opportuni-
ty cost of remaining in business are lower during recessions.6 As a second exam-
ple, we have modeled firm performance as then outcome of arithmetic Brownian 
motion with drift. It is likely that alternative assumptions, such as the inclusion 
of mean reversion or treating growth as the process of learning about ability in 
the presence of a stationary process for the stochastic component [cf. Jovanovic 
(1982)], may produce quantitatively different results. Nonetheless, the paper rais-
es a plausible mechanism, that seems to have been overlooked, by which transito-
ry economics fluctuations can have long-term consequences on firm performance. 
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